Abstract: Recent years have seen a growing literature on ex post assessment of merger cases, primarily evaluating the "correctness" of specific merger decisions by competition authorities.
Introduction
Merger control refers to the procedure of reviewing mergers under competition law. Merger control regimes are adopted to prevent anti-competitive consequences of mergers.
1 Examples of such anti-competitive consequences are price increases for consumers, decreases in the quality of products and services offered, lowered incentives for investment and innovation or the creation of * Senior Economist, Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission. Email: yavuz.karagoek@weko.admin.ch. ** Chief Economist, Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission. Email: samuel.rutz@weko.admin.ch. All views contained in this paper are solely those of the authors and cannot be attributed to the Swiss Competition Commission or its Secretariat. The authors would like to thank Martin Brown, Kai Hüschelrath and Sarah Rivière for helpful comments. 1 In this article, the term "merger" will be used as a synonym for the more general term "concentration" used e.g. in European competition law which covers mergers and takeovers and more generally any situation where a firm takes de facto control over another firm.
market entry and exit barriers. Ultimately, the consequence of the implementation of an anticompetitive merger is the loss of social welfare. In general, a precondition for a merger to be anticompetitive is the existence of significant pre-or post-merger market power of the involved parties. Most mergers in practice do not create enough market power to raise competitive concerns. Rather, such mergers may -under certain circumstances -be efficient and welfare enhancing. However, there are clearly mergers, in particular in concentrated, oligopolistic markets, which create or strengthen market power and therefore inherently contain a potential for welfare reducing effects. Typically, merger control regimes consist of two elements: (1) The notification rules which determine whether or not a merger must be notified to the competition authority. (2) The substantive test which clarifies the criteria according to which a merger is analysed by a competition authority. In other words, while the notification rules determine the number of mergers that are reviewed by a competition authority, the substantive test allows to distinguish between pro-and anti-competitive mergers. Ultimately, any merger review results in either the clearance of the merger -possibly subject to structural or behavioural remedies -or a prohibition.
Whether the worldwide established merger control regimes achieve however the desired effect of preventing the implementation of anti-competitive mergers is a different issue. In this context, there is currently a growing literature on ex post assessment of merger decisions. This literature primarily aims at evaluating the "correctness" of specific merger decisions, i.e.
answering the question whether the competition authorities' predictions of the competitive effects of a merger were accurate. Pautler (2003) for example overviews the empirical literature regarding the effects of mergers and presents case studies. Assessments of the competitive effects of mergers have also been conducted by competition authorities -see e.g. Competition
Commission (2008) -or by outside experts, often on behalf of governmental institutions. 3 Other authors, such as Duso et al. (2007) , have focussed on the identification of systematic errors and biases within a certain merger control regime or on the comparison of merger enforcement policies in different countries. 4 A common feature of these assessment studies is that they rely on actual merger decisions of competition authorities. To our best knowledge there is however no academic work attempting to assess whether notification regimes in merger control are efficient. 5 This is not an unimportant question since -as mentioned above -the notification rules determine the set of mergers that are subject to merger control, i.e. the number of mergers which eventually may be reviewed by a competition authority. In other words, it is one (important) question whether a competition authority does a "good job" in a specific case and another whether the competition authority is actually in a position to review the accurate mergers, i.e. mergers that potentially raise competitive concerns. Although, in practice, the design of notification regimes does exhibit country-specific differences, a merger that is not subject to notification obligations -even if it
shows clear signs of anti-competitive effects -cannot be scrutinized by the competition authority in most countries. Consequently, on the one hand, a too permissive notification regime may have detrimental effects on social welfare by allowing the implementation of anti-competitive mergers.
On the other hand, however, too strict a notification regime may put unacceptably high administrative and financial burdens on firms and the competition authority, and ultimately hamper efficient merger activity. In essence, an optimal notification regime should therefore capture the mergers with a significant potential for anti-competitive effects from the set of all consummated mergers with a nexus to a certain economy.
This paper attempts to contribute to the merger evaluation literature by exploring the trade-off between too permissive and too strict notification regimes. To this purpose the effectiveness of the Swiss notification regime is evaluated. Switzerland seems well suited for such an exercise, since -in international comparison -the Swiss notification system is very permissive. There is consequently a realistic danger that a substantial fraction of mergers are implemented in Switzerland which are not subject to notification obligations, and which are likely to have anticompetitive effects. 
Notification Rules and Turnover Thresholds
To allow firms to determine without difficulties whether or not they are required to notify a merger project, notification rules should be designed as simple as possible. Therefore, in most merger control regimes the notification rules simply amount to turnover thresholds: if the merging firms exceed the specified turnover thresholds they are required to notify the project, otherwise there is no obligation to notify. 6 Typically, three types of turnover thresholds can be distinguished in practice: (1) worldwide cumulative turnover thresholds; (2) domestic cumulative turnover thresholds, which usually refer to the aggregate turnover of the merging firms in the financial year preceding the merger; and (3) domestic individual turnover thresholds, which in most cases require that at least two of the involved firms reach a certain turnover within the considered country. In general, the worldwide and domestic cumulative turnover thresholds are intended to ensure that only important mergers and mergers with a likely impact on the domestic economy are subject to notification. In notification regimes where both of these provisions can be 6 An economically more adequate criteria to determine the duty to notify would e.g. be market share thresholds. This would however imply that parties willing to merge have to delineate relevant markets and calculate market shares to determine whether their merger project must be notified to the competition authority. Market delineation requires specific knowledge and is not an exact science. Therefore, market share thresholds lack the objectivity and simpleness of turnover thresholds. For a discussion of different notification rules see as well ICN (2008) .
found, exceeding one of these two thresholds is usually sufficient to trigger notification obligations. The individual domestic turnover thresholds aim at removing notification obligations in the case that a large domestic firm buys a foreign firm with limited business activity in the considered country. Depending on the country, all, one or a combination of the described provisions may apply and other provisions may complete the notification rules. DITT is defined as the turnover value that must be exceeded by at least two firms involved in a 7 The Swiss Cartel Act, for example, has an additional provision that merger notification is mandatory (i.e. independent of turnovers) if a firm has been held dominant in a final decision. Another example of additional provisions is that the target firm in a merger has a domestic turnover exceeding a certain value. Such a provision can e.g. be found in the merger notification regimes of the UK and Italy. 8 While Luxembourg is the only EU-15 country without a merger notification regime, the notification rules in the UK do not include any of the thresholds described. These two countries are therefore missing in Table 1. merger project. Furthermore, column 4 of Table 1 shows the GDP in 2011 of all considered countries.
As can be seen from In what follows we attempt to answer the question introduced above as to whether or not the permissive notification regime in Switzerland is likely to cause a welfare loss to society, i.e.
whether under the current Swiss notification regime the appropriate mergers are reviewed.
Merger Activity in Switzerland
As a preliminary step to assess whether the Swiss notification regime serves its purpose, we describe in this section merger activity in Switzerland. While statistics on notified mergers are readily available, the number of mergers not subject to notification obligations in Switzerland seems to be largely unknown so far. Our dataset allows -to our best knowledge for the first time -to quantify merger activity in Switzerland in a systematic way. We further provide information 10 Legal entry barriers may e.g. involve tariff and non-tariff obstacles to trade, while natural entry barriers may be created by transportation cost. An important structural entry barrier may consist in the need to capture a relatively large fraction of a (small) market in a short time to produce goods cost-efficiently. In particular if investments involve sunk costs, market entry may be risky. For a description of the potential consequences of "smallness" see e.g. Gal (2003) . An application of the theory of small economies and competition policy to Switzerland can be found in Rutz (2012, forthcoming) . 11 As mentioned in footnote 7, the Swiss Cartel Act knows the provision that merger notification is mandatory if a firm been held dominant has in a final decision. It therefore occasionally happens that smaller mergers, which do not exceed the legal turnover thresholds, are notified to ComCo. Although only anecdotal, this evidence suggests that such smaller mergers may indeed lead to extremely high concentration in the markets concerned.
about the characteristics of selling and acquiring firms involved in mergers as well as the concerned industries.
Notified Mergers
As can be seen from Figure 1, one third of all mergers reviewed in-depth by ComCo were only approved after the parties agreed to adopt remedies. In all other cases, the competitive concerns were dispelled after an in-depth investigation.
Most mergers typically involve horizontal and vertical/conglomerate elements. In the great majority of all reviewed mergers (Phase I and II) it was primarily the horizontal element -if any -which raised competitive concerns. Depending on the sector, vertical issues may however hold a certain importance. For example in the retail sector, not only the effects of a merger on the retail market itself may raise competitive concerns, but also the vertical effects in the procurement markets. In accordance with economic theory, purely vertical mergers however have never raised serious competitive concerns to date, i.e. such concerns could regularly be resolved within Phase I of the investigation. Christensen et. al (2007) . 13 Note, that this calculation does not account for mergers where the parties voluntarily committed to remedies in Phase I to resolve competitive concerns or where a merger project was withdrawn after a Phase I investigation. The overall number of mergers raising competitive concerns is therefore effectively somewhat higher. 14 In 2010 ComCo blocked a "three to two merger" in the Swiss telecommunications market on the grounds of impending post-merger collective dominance (decision France Télécom SA/Sunrise Communications AG, LPC, 2010/3, pp. 499-561) . The parties to the merger project renounced their right to appeal against this decision. In the few other cases where ComCo blocked a merger, the decision was overruled by the appeals court. 15 Compared to horizontal mergers, vertical mergers are in general considered to be less problematic: as a rule of thumb, a vertical merger does not raise competitive concerns when no firm with substantial market power is involved, the merged firm does not hold substantial market power and interbrand competition is fierce. For a detailed discussion see e.g. Rey and Tirole (2007) . 16 This does however not imply that these two sectors will completely disappear from our analysis. In particular, if a public sector firm acquires a plant from the private sector of the economy, this is a merger which may be captured by 
a. Plant Transactions
To quantify merger activity in Switzerland, the variables PlantNumber (PN) and FirmNumber Table 3 presents the results of the above described plant transaction identification process.
Altogether, 46'278 plant transactions were observed between 2001 and 2008, which amounts to an annual average of roughly 6'600 transactions.
competition law. In other words, as soon as a plant of a public sector firm is operating in the private sector, competition law applies. 17 A similar identification process was used by Burghardt and Helm (2010) . 
b. Plant Transactions Related to a Merger
Not every change of the firm number of a specific plant between the inventory counts is however necessarily associated with a merger. Such a change of the firm number may merely reflect events such as an ownership change, the change of a firm's name or the foundation of a new firm.
As long as there are not two distinct firms involved in a plant transaction, this normally would not be considered as a merger under competition law. To ensure that we only capture mergerrelevant transactions we therefore require that the acquiring and the selling firm already existed in the previous inventory count.
Note that this procedure leads to a conservative (i.e. lower-bound) estimate of plant transactions associated with mergers. In particular, there is the possibility that merger-relevant transactions took place although the acquiring firm did not exist in the previous inventory count. This is due to the fact that in the periods between the inventory counts -which we cannot observe in the dataset -new firms may have been founded and a range of transactions may have taken place. To illustrate, assume that we identify a change of the firm number of a specific plant in the dataset, the selling firm does however not exist anymore in the subsequent inventory count.
On the first view this would seem indicative of a simple ownership change. However, the selling firm may only have sold part of its plants to a newly founded firm and then went bankrupt with the rest of its plants, i.e. a real merger took place. Alternatively, a situation where we observe that two distinct firms exist after a transaction took place suggests prima vista merger activity; but this could e.g. only reflect a spin-off, i.e. no real merger took place. Thus, since we cannot be sure whether such plant transactions really involve a merger or not we prefer to work with a lower-bound estimate in what follows. In general, due to the relatively short periods between the inventory counts, it seems likely that the chosen procedure adequately approximates the number of merger-relevant transactions in the periods 2001-2005 and 2005-2008. As can be seen from Table 3 , only 14% of all identified plant transactions are associated with a merger. In other words, the vast majority of the identified plant transactions seem to be related to events such as ownership changes, changes of firms' name or the foundation of new firms. On average, 905 plant transactions connected to a merger were annually consummated, involving 424 firms. Expectedly, the majority of these transactions (69%) involve micro plants with less than 10 employees, followed by transactions of small plants (23%) and medium plants (7%).
Only 1% of all merger-relevant transactions are related to large plants with more than 250 employees.
c. Total Number of Mergers
The number of merger-relevant transactions in a certain period cannot directly be equated with the number of mergers that took place: some firms may have acquired more than one plant of another firm in the same transaction. We therefore consider the situation where a firm sold several of its plants to another firm as a single merger case. Again, due to the non-observability of events between the inventory counts, this procedure results in an estimate that is on the conservative side. In other words, it is of course possible that within a considered period a firm sequentially acquired plants from another firm and was therefore involved in more than one merger. Since the periods between the three inventory counts amount however only to four (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) respectively three (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) years, the case of a sequential acquisition of several plants of a firm is likely to be an exception.
After controlling for the possibility that a firm may have acquired more than one plant, we count a total of 3'818 mergers in the seven-year period between 2001 and 2008 (see Table 3 ).
This amounts to an average of 545 mergers annually. Consequently, with an average of 37 mergers notifications per year, roughly 7% of all consummated merges are currently subject to merger control in Switzerland. Considering that most mergers -in particular small mergers -are not likely to change the market structure in a substantial way and therefore do not raise competitive concerns, this seems a priori not an unreasonably low number.
Size of Selling and Acquiring Firms
Our dataset further allows a more detailed picture of the Swiss merger landscape to be drawn.
First, it is possible to classify the identified mergers and plant transactions with respect to the size of the selling and the acquiring firms (see Table 4 ). Focussing on the selling firms, it can be noted that micro firms are in general one-plant firms and every plant transaction represents therefore a merger. Further, micro firms sell their plant in 75% of all cases to other micro and small firms.
Small firms are in the majority of all cases one-or two-plant firms -the number of plant transactions and mergers in our dataset consequently still does not differ substantially -and they sell their plants mostly to other small and medium firms. The trend that firms predominately sell to equal-sized or larger firms is as well observed for medium firms: a merger in this category involves on average 2.6 plants and the buyer is in roughly 90% of all cases a medium or a large firm. A merger involving a large firm as the seller consists on average of 7 plants and the acquirer is in most cases (71%) another large firm. a The definition of firm size is the same as in Table 3 : micro firm = less than 10 employees, small firm = 10-49 employees, medium firm = 50-249 employees and large firm = more than 250 employees.
Focussing on the acquiring firms the picture is reversed: firms predominately buy plants from smaller or equal-sized firms. The case where "David buys Goliath" is, as expected, the exception.
Worth mentioning is however that large firms merge roughly equally often with micro, small, medium and large firms. Thus, for large firms the trend to mainly buy from similar-sized firms cannot be confirmed. Further, the absolute number of mergers consummated by the differentsized acquiring firms is roughly equal. Given the fact that only 1'150 (0.4%) of all firms in Switzerland qualify as large, it is however -in a relative comparison -in particular large firms that are most likely to be involved in mergers. With 741 respectively 670 mergers these two industries together account for roughly 40% of all observed mergers. There are another six industries where more than 100 mergers were observed: 
Problematic Horizontal Mergers
The 3818 mergers identified in our dataset include horizontal and vertical/conglomerate mergers. 18 For two reasons we will primarily focus on horizontal mergers in what follows. First, as mentioned in section 3.1, there is a wide consensus that compared to horizontal mergers, vertical mergers are in general less problematic. Second, the anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers primarily arise from post-merger incentives to foreclose markets. The assessment of such foreclosure incentives implies however detailed firm-and industry-specific information of upand down-stream markets which is not observable in our dataset. In a first step we therefore determine the nature of all identified mergers, i.e. horizontal vs. vertical mergers. We then apply a screening test based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration to all identified horizontal mergers to determine their likely competitive effects.
Horizontal vs. Vertical Mergers and Market Definition
A simple criteria to determine the nature of a merger, i.e. horizontal vs. vertical, is to consider whether the acquired plant is operating in a market where the buyer is already present. In antitrust terms, this however implies the definition of the relevant market. 19 Beyond the fact that the delimitation of all concerned relevant markets for the identified mergers would be a very time- 18 The analysis of conglomerate mergers is largely identical to the one of vertical mergers, i.e. such mergers primarily raise concerns of market foreclosure. In what follows we will therefore not distinguish between vertical and conglomerate mergers but use the term "vertical" for both types of concentrations. 19 The relevant market consists of the set of products and geographical areas to which the products of competing firms belong. It is such a set of products (and areas) that determines the competitive constraints to the firms under analysis. In practice, the definition of a relevant market is a fairly complicated process which competition authorities typically only do on a case by case basis and which requires a great deal of industry-and firm-specific information.
For an introduction to market definition see e.g. Motta (2004) .
and resource-consuming undertaking, we do not dispose of the information in our dataset to carry out such an analysis. To deal with this problem, we choose to proceed as follows: As an approximation for market definition we rely on the lowest level of the NOGA industry classification. NOGA uses a five-tiered structure to classify 794 different economic activities. In other words, a 5-digit code is assigned to each activity. 20 Table 5 illustrates the design of the 5-digit code with a concrete example. As can be seen from this example, the 5-digit industry code breaks down the economic activities to a level of detail which in many cases may serve as a reasonable approximation for "classical market definition". whether a merger is horizontal or vertical. More specifically, relying on the earlier inventory counts implies that the pre-merger firm structure is considered as the determining one, which seems to be adequate for all mergers having taken place shortly after an inventory count. In contrary, for a merger that was consummated shortly before the next inventory count, the decisive firm structure is likely to be better reflected by the later census. As Table 6 shows, 20 The first four levels of the NOGA structure are compatible with the NACE classification system. Level five takes into account details that reflect the Swiss reality.
whether the earlier or the later inventory counts are chosen as the relevant selection criteria influences the number of identified horizontal and vertical mergers. 21 In particular, when relying on the later inventory counts (2005/2008) , the number of vertical mergers increases by 171 (5%).
For these 171 merger cases no conclusive answer can be given as to whether they are of horizontal or vertical nature. The difference can be explained simply through events such as market exit and entry of transactions. Note that, in the case that a firm acquired more than one plant, not all of the identified horizontal merger may be purely horizontal -they also may involve vertical elements. 21 Note that the presented results may also be influenced by the chosen approach to market definition. In other words, working with a higher level of the NOGA-classification -which implies a wider market definition -may increase the number of horizontal mergers relative to vertical mergers. We therefore conducted the same exercise on the 4-digit industry level. The difference between the two possible market definitions is minimal: the number of horizontal mergers increases by roughly 100 when applying the wider market definition. This seems to confirm that our chosen approximation for market definition and our results are fairly robust.
A further analysis reveals however that only 49 transactions of the 2068 identified horizontal mergers involve such vertical elements, i.e. are not purely horizontal.
These figures show that the absolute number of horizontal mergers (54%) in Switzerland is not much larger than the number of vertical mergers (46%). However, on average, horizontal mergers are larger than vertical mergers, i.e. horizontal mergers typically involve larger firms than vertical mergers and the number of consigned plants per merger is higher. The identified vertical mergers may further again be classified by the distinct NOGA industries on the two-digit level (see Table A1 of the appendix).
Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
A widely used screening device for horizontal mergers, e.g. in the European Union and the USA, is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration. 22 According to the US Horizontal
Merger Guidelines 23 for example, a merger is likely to be approved without an in-depth investigation, if the post-merger HHI is lower than 1'000. If the post-merger HHI is between 1'000 and 1'800, the merger is normally approved as long as it does not result in an increase in concentration of more than 100 points. If the post-merger HHI amounts to more than 1'800, an in-depth investigation is only refrained from if concentration increases by less than 50 points. In all other cases, there is a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition, i.e. such mergers raise "significant competitive concerns" and will be investigated in-depth. 24 It is however important to note that these HHI-thresholds only serve as a crude screening device and
are not strictly applied in practice by the US agencies.
25
Given the market definition introduced above, it would be interesting to know how many of the 2'068 identified horizontal merges in our dataset would have passed such a HHI-threshold screening test. Our data is however only partially suited to calculate HHIs, since information 22 The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of market shares (s i ) of all firms i in the industry considered: HHI = ∑s i 2 . The index can vary between 0 (when each firm has a market share close to 0) and 10'000 which reflects a situation where there is only one firm in the market. 23 http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. 24 The respective HHI-thresholds in the European Union are somewhat less strict. The EU Merger Guidelines set a safe harbor for mergers where (i) the post-merger HHI is between 1'000 and 2'000 and where the "delta" (i.e. the change in the HHI arising from the merger) is less than 250 and (ii) where the post-merger HHI is above 2'000 but where the delta is less than 150. 25 See e.g. Scheffman (2002). about the market shares of the firms is indispensable to calculate such a concentration measure.
The best way to derive the market share of a firm depends on the specific characteristics of the market being considered. Often, sales data allows a good approximation of market shares. We unfortunately do not have access to such sales data. However, our dataset comprises data on employees on the firm and plant level and allows therefore to calculate HHIs on the basis of employment. This seems a reasonable approximation for measuring pre-and post-merger concentration within an industry since it is natural to assume that there is a direct link between the number of employees and the turnover of a firm within a distinct industry. In other words, if labor productivity within an industry (on the five-digit level) does not systematically differ between firms, the number of employees of a firm should serve as a sensible proxy for its market share.
Three further methodological issues need to be discussed. First, the level and the change of the HHI in the distinct industries between the inventory counts is not only influenced by mergers but also by entry and exit of firms and plants, changes in the size of the plants etc. The HHI screening test is however designed as a static test, i.e. at this stage of the merger review process it should only capture merger-induced changes of the HHI. Therefore, to derive a measure for purely merger-induced changes of the HHI, we proceed as follows: to calculate post-merger HHIs we rely on the market structure as given by the later inventory count, i.e. for a merger The second issue to be discussed is the following: the procedure described above does not, so far, unambiguously identify the individual contribution of a specific merger to the change of the industry-HHI. This is due to two facts. First, more than one merger may have been consummated within a specific industry. Second, vertical mergers do also influence the concentration within an industry. For example, if a firm which currently owns two plants in a specific industry sells one of its plants to another firm, formerly not present in this industry, this leads to decreasing concentration (i.e. a lower HHI). To determine the contribution of a specific horizontal merger to the change in the HHI we proceed as follows: in the context of our analysis the calculation of the HHI in a specific industry can be expressed as 
where a denotes the number of employees of the sold plant(s) in the considered merger between the buying firm b and the selling firm s. Note that, due to the procedure described above to derive purely merger-induced changes of the HHI, U pre = U post . Rearranging terms then yields the following expression to calculate the change of the HHI caused by a specific merger:
Finally, not all the mergers do exhibit the same geographic dimension, i.e. mergers may have a transnational, national, regional or even local dimension. Unfortunately, we do not possess any information about the geographic dimension of the identified horizontal mergers in our dataset.
We proceed by working with two geographical market definitions. In this section, we first apply the HHI screening test by assuming that all identified mergers have a national dimension. 27 Then, in the following section, we repeat the exercise by reducing the geographical market to the next smaller entity available in our dataset.
Column 2 of Table 7 summarizes the results of our analysis. We identify a 143 mergers in the considered time period which involved at least one plant transaction in an industry with an HHIvalue of more than 1'000. Thus, roughly 7% of all identified horizontal mergers took place in industries characterized by considerable concentration. Only 32 of these mergers caused however a problematic increase of the HHI. This amounts to an annual average of 4.5 merger cases involving plant transactions that could possibly be problematic. Thus, if the assumption that most mergers do at least exhibit a national dimension adequately mirrors the Swiss merger landscape and given the fact that on average 3.5 mergers are reviewed in-depth annually in Switzerland,
there is a good chance that a significant part of the mergers identified as potentially raising competitive concerns were scrutinized by ComCo. Note that a significant part of notified and reviewed mergers in Switzerland indeed do have a transnational dimension (see the description of the "no or double control" problem in section 2.1). Most of these mergers are however not captured by our identification process since the transacted plant(s) are located abroad. In other words, notification duties are only triggered because internationally operating firms involved in the merger do e.g. have their headquarters or subsidiary companies in Switzerland.
Effects of Reduced Geographical Market Size
The findings presented may change when choosing a regional market definition, i.e. accounting for the fact that a certain fraction of the mergers identified may predominately be of a regional dimension. As mentioned in section 2, in a small country like Switzerland such regional markets may be characterized by limited demand and the existence of entry and exit barriers. In other words, regional markets in small countries often tend to be relatively concentrated which increases the likelihood of anti-competitive effects of a merger. Thus, on the one hand, reducing geographical market size is -in particular in a small country -likely to increase the number of potentially problematic mergers. On the other hand, however, there is an opposite effect:
switching from a national to a regional market definition diminishes the total number of horizontal mergers. This is due to the fact that some firms buy plants in regions where they have not been operating before. Thus, in such cases a merger no longer causes horizontal effects.
Rather, such mergers may in essence be described as the entry of a firm into a new regional market which will decrease concentration in the considered market.
It is further important to note that reducing the geographical market size leads to an overestimate of the number of potentially problematic mergers: when working with regional markets it cannot be excluded that a fraction of the identified problematic mergers raising competitive concerns objectively exhibit a national (or transnational) dimension. Since this bias increases with reduced market size we limit our analysis to the next smaller geographical entity available in our dataset, which is the division of Switzerland into the three main linguistic and cultural regions: the German, the French and the Italian part of Switzerland. In this sense, the results we present in the following should be interpreted in the sense of an upper bound estimate.
Column 3 of Table 7 shows the results when limiting the geographic dimension of all mergers to the three linguistic and cultural regions of Switzerland. As expected, the number of identified problematic mergers increases, while the total number of horizontal mergers decreases by roughly 6%. Under this scenario 204 mergers involved at least one plant transaction in an (regional) industry with a HHI-value of more than 1'000 whereof 49 mergers caused a problematic increase in the HHI. The increase seems thus rather modest -the absolute number of problematic mergers only rises by 17. On average, we identify 7 potentially problematic mergers annually. Further, as mentioned, this figure most likely overestimates the number of problematic mergers, since some of the mergers identified may in reality be of a larger than a regional dimension. Accounting for this bias, the effect of reduced market size appears surprisingly weak.
Evaluation of the Swiss Notification Regime

Review Activity of ComCo
When assuming a national market definition the above analysis identified 32 merger cases that may raise competitive concerns. Unfortunately, it is not possible to exactly determine which fraction of these 32 merger cases has indeed been reviewed by ComCo. As mentioned, given the fact that in Switzerland, on average, 3.5 mergers are reviewed in-depth annually, it is however likely that a significant number of the mergers identified as problematic have been reviewed by ComCo. It is further likely that another fraction of the identified mergers has been notified and cleared after a Phase I investigation 28 ; e.g. because the geographic dimension of the mergercontrary to the assumption of national markets -was considered to be transnational or a slightly different product market definition.
This suggestion may be tested by examining the industries where the mergers that were identified as problematic took place. Table 8 shows the number of problematic horizontal mergers in the respective two-digit industries and describes the review activity of ComCo in these industries in the considered time period.
Overall, there are 17 industries where problematic mergers were identified. In most of these industries there was indeed notified merger activity which in several cases has led to in-depth investigations. For example in the retail trade industry (NOGA 47) ComCo conducted 6 in-depth reviews 29 and cleared several smaller mergers after Phase I investigations in the time period considered. Also in the food industry (NOGA 10) and civil engineering industry (NOGA 42) indepth investigations took place. 30 In the manufacturing industries (NOGA 20, 21, 23, 25) , industries where mergers directly or indirectly related to aviation took place (NOGA 30, 51, 52), 28 In the period between 2001 and 2008 roughly 270 mergers were notified in Switzerland. 29 These mergers are Coop/EPA (LPC 2002/3, pp. 505-522) , Coop/Waro (LPC 2003/3, pp. 559-601) , Migros/Denner (LPC 2008/1, pp. 129-212) , Coop/Fust (LPC 2008/3, pp. 475-506) , fenaco/Steffen-Ris (LPC 2008/2, pp. 209-237) and Coop/Carrefour (LPC 2008/4, pp. 593-661) . 30 Emmi Gruppe/Swiss Diary Food (LPC 2003/3, pp. 529-548) the textile industry (NOGA 13), the wood industry (NOGA 16), manufacturing of furniture (NOGA 31) and other manufacturing (NOGA 32). In each of these industries one possibly problematic merger was identified. It is further interesting to note that there is one industry (media) which was not identified in our analysis where a substantial number of in-depth reviews has been conducted by ComCo. This is however not very surprising, since media markets are regularly regional or even locally delineated. Thus, when assuming national markets, the chosen approach seems to produce surprisingly adequate results. In particular, the problematic industries identified and the industries where ComCo conducted Phase I and Phase II investigations are largely consistent. This indicates that the Swiss merger notification regime -by and large -captures a significant part of the mergers that potentially raise competitive concerns. In other words, although characterized by very high notification thresholds, the Swiss merger notification regime seems a priori not to fail completely.
As can be seen from Table A1 in ComCo however regularly reviews a substantial number of mergers. It is seems therefore sensible to assume that the majority of these mergers were notified to and reviewed by ComCo. Thus, even when working with a narrower market definition to capture potentially problematic mergers in the internal markets, the Swiss merger notification regime seems to work quite well. So far, our results suggest no urgent need for a revision of the notification thresholds.
Problematic Mergers and Firm Size
As an additional check of this suggestion, one may analyze the size of the firms involved in the problematic mergers identified (see Table 9 ). Given the high notification thresholds in Switzerland, it is likely that primarily the mergers between medium/large firms are captured by the Swiss notification regime. Table 9 confirms that when assuming a national market definition roughly two thirds of all problematic mergers identified indeed do involve large firms as buyers and sellers. Approximately 90% of all identified transactions further involved either large or medium firms and are therefore likely to be subject to notification duties. There are only three potentially problematic merger cases involving small firms and no problematic transactions involving micro firms. Consequently, approximately 10% of the mergers identified as raising competitive concerns potentially fail to be reviewed by the competition authority. There is no doubt that also such smaller mergers may have anti-competitive effects. However, to capture these mergers a substantial decrease of the notification thresholds would be necessary, presumably triggering a flood of additional merger notifications. Decreasing the notification threshold to a level where e.g. all mergers involving small, medium and large companies would be subject to notification duties, has -relying on our analysis in section 3.3 -the potential of increasing the number of notifications by 600%, i.e. from actual 37 to 224 notifications annually.
Accounting for the fact that merger notification implies considerable administrative and financial burdens for firms and the competition authority and -if too strict -may hamper efficient merger activity, it seems currently not advisable to decrease notification thresholds in a substantial manner. Table 3 .
These conclusions do not alter substantially when considering the scenario with a regional market definition. Keeping in mind that the figures presented above most likely overestimate the number of problematic merger cases, still over 50% of all problematic transactions identified involve large firms as sellers and buyers. Further, an additional 25% of the problematic merger cases involve medium firms. Thus, the majority of all problematic mergers are, under this scenario, also likely to be captured by the Swiss notification regime. A decrease of the notification thresholds to also capture all transactions where a small firm is involved -implying the above-described consequences for the number of notified mergers -would only lead to roughly one more in-depth investigation annually.
In summary, it is not only the review activity of ComCo which suggests that the Swiss notification regime is -by and large -accurate but also the low number of identified problematic mergers which involve small and micro firms. There is a clear positive correlation between the size of the merging firms and the potential anti-competitive effects which seems to justify the high notification thresholds in Switzerland. The costs of a substantial decrease of the notifications thresholds (in the form of financial and administrative burdens for firms and the competition authority as well as the effect of hampering efficient merger activity) are likely to outweigh the economic benefits of the additional possible prohibition of a minor number of small anticompetitive mergers. A major revision of the Swiss notification regime, in particular a decrease of the notification thresholds, does not currently seem urgent.
Summary and Conclusions
Recent years have seen a growing literature on ex post assessment of merger decisions, primarily evaluating the "correctness" of specific merger decisions by competition authorities. The question whether notification regimes are efficient, i.e. whether competition authorities are in a position to review the set of mergers that potentially raises competitive concerns, has however largely been neglected so far. This paper attempts to fill this gap by evaluating the effectiveness of the Swiss merger notification regime. In general, such an exercise seems of importance for at least two reasons: it may, on the one hand, allow an increase in the effectiveness of established merger control regimes by adjusting turnover thresholds to efficient levels. On the other hand, it can assist countries wishing to introduce merger control to identify initial reasonable levels for turnover thresholds.
In a first step, a comparison between the merger notification regimes in the EU-15 countries and Switzerland has been provided. This comparison highlighted the permissive notification regime in Switzerland. In a second step, based on compulsory inventory firm counts, a procedure to identify mergers was derived and a detailed picture of the merger activity in Switzerland was given. We then applied an HHI-threshold screening test to all identified horizontal mergers. This resulted, depending on the chosen geographic market definition, in the identification of 32 respectively 49 potentially problematic horizontal mergers in the time period considered. The actual merger review activity of ComCo seems however to suggest that most of the problematic industries concerned are under regular supervision, i.e. it is likely that the vast majority of the problematic mergers identified has been notified and reviewed by ComCo in a Phase I or Phase II investigation. Furthermore, the low number of identified problematic mergers involving small and micro firms points in the direction that the Swiss notification thresholds, although in international comparison very tolerant, by and large serve their purpose. Thus, based on the available data, our analysis supports the conclusion that there is no urgent need for a revision of the notification thresholds in the Swiss merger control regime.
Two comments may be appropriate in the context of this conclusion: First, our results only support the conclusion that a general decrease of the notification thresholds would most likely be inefficient. This does by no means exclude the possibility that lower turnover thresholds for some specific industries -although in effect somewhat increasing the complexity of the notification regime -could be a reasonable measure. It is for example well known that hospital mergers often exhibit predominantly local effects. Secondly, even if our analysis had shown a need for revision of the notification thresholds, such a step would only have made sense in connection with a modification of the substantive test applied in Switzerland. Currently, Switzerland uses a very permissive dominance test, which renders the prohibition of mergers raising competitive concerns extremely difficult. 31 Thus, given the current substantive test, decreasing notification thresholds would in the first place have the effect of increasing the workload of the competition authority without substantially strengthening the enforcement regime. It is however fair to mentioned that this problem has largely been recognized. As a result of a recent evaluation of the Swiss Cartel Act in 2009 a recommendation to introduce a "substantial impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test" was issued to the Swiss Parliament. 32 Whether the legislator will follow this recommendation is not decided yet.
It is further interesting to note that our analysis suggests that turnover thresholds -although these are admittedly only second best compared to economically more adequate criteria such as market share thresholds -seem to produce acceptable results in a country like Switzerland. This 31 Under a dominance test a merger may be prohibited if it results in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position which would significantly impede effective competition. Swiss courts have however in the past advanced the view that the creation or strengthening of a dominant position which significantly impedes effective competition is not enough to prohibit a merger. Rather, under the Swiss Cartel Act, a merger may only be prohibited if it is additionally likely that competition is eliminated in the market(s) concerned. In other words, in Switzerland a merger may only be prohibited if it leads to an extremely high concentration in a market (e.g. a merger to monopoly), which -in essence -requires the creation or strengthening of super-dominance. 32 As the name indicates, under a SIEC test a merger may be prohibited where the effect is to substantially impede effective competition in the concerned market(s), i.e. dominance is not a precondition for blocking a merger. The SIEC test is widely applied in the EU.
is due to the strong positive correlation between the size of merging firms and the potential resulting anti-competitive effects identified in our analysis. In other words, even in smaller internal markets, which may -as it is often alleged -be characterized by concentrated and oligopolistic market structures, it is not the mergers between smaller firms that primarily raise competitive concerns but the mergers between large firms. Therefore, turnover thresholds, which effectively exempt smaller firms from merger control, seem not to cause significant type II errors (false positive).
Although our evidence suggests that the tolerant notification thresholds in Switzerland -by and large -produce adequate results, it is an open question as to whether this implies that other countries' turnover thresholds are inefficiently low.
There are indications that certain European countries are indeed concerned about the number of unnecessary merger notifications. In Ireland, for example, the notification provisions were amended in 2006 to decrease the number of mergers being notified with no or little nexus to Ireland. Gorecki (2011) discusses the effects of these amended notification provisions. Also Italy decided to change its merger notification requirements to limit the number of unnecessary notifications. The new provisions are effective as of January 2013. In both cases the increase of the notification thresholds to decrease the number of unnecessary merger notifications seems however not to have been debated. In the case that the merger landscape and the market structure in other countries are similar to the one found in Switzerland, this certainly would serve as a strong indication that there is scope for a thorough assessment of the level of notification thresholds.
